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S C O P E

S A I N T

V

18 - 28 OCTOBER 1971

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EXERCISE RECAP

1. Scope Saint V was an annual [] deployment designed 25X1
in particular to exercise operations and equipment compatibil- 25X1
ity [] under conditions of controlled exposure. The 25X1
operation involved one article, [] personnel,
and 29,736 pounds of cargo. It was the first such deployment
for one-quarter of the participants.
2. The exercise began on 18 Oct 71 with the arrival of the
C-141 transport at Edwards. OPLAN timing was essentially
adhered to throughout the deployment phase and the only
major problem encountered involved terminal weather at [] 25X1
[] Crosswind upon article arrival required use of a
closed runway for recovery.
3. Weather again provided the only major problem during the
employment phase. The first training mission was slipped one
day because of excessive crosswinds. The second mission was
conducted in accordance with scheduled timing.
4. Redeployment was complicated by maintenance problems on
the primary C-141 support aircraft. A replacement was obtained
and by combining an expeditious loading with a direct routing
from [] to the CONUS, the last phase was accomplished 25X1
almost on the original schedule. Following a CONUS arrival 25X1
[] due to bad weather [] the redeployment
continued without further incident to Edwards. The exercise
concluded with the arrival of the C-141 [] on 28 Oct 71. 25X1

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~~SECRET~~OPERATIONS SUMMARY

Scope Saint V deployed to [] with a total of [] personnel. [] deployed ahead of the main group to [] and returned after the article had returned to home station. [] headquarters personnel joined the group at [] the enroute refueling stop. The C-141 support aircraft arrival and departure times from Edwards were changed on late notice, however, the three hour load time provided was adequate and the 1400L departure time was made good. No particular problems encountered [] Some minor maintenance was performed on the support C-141. Four hours ground time gave the group an appropriate break for dinner and a stretch. Forecast weather was a factor [] until just prior to descent into [] A check with the tower however, showed considerable improvement and diversion was not necessary. The detachment unloaded and moved into the hangar and facilities that had been made available. Although no actual problem was encountered, considerable concern resulted in the requesting and eventual use of a closed runway (08-26) for article recovery. The known rather limited cross-wind capability of the article and the predominate winds [] makes this [] questionable for use for Scope Saint exercises. One training flight was delayed for 24 hours due to forecast cross-winds. It is highly possible that runway 08-26 will not be available on the next Scope Saint, should [] be selected. In this event the undesirable probability of diversion remains high. Less than a full cross-wind capability should be a key factor to be

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considered following a flight [] duration.

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Another noteworthy item which should be considered in future deployments was the excessive telephonic communication when message traffic would otherwise suffice. From a security standpoint, telephone communications are not desirable if the information is in fact repetitious or can be transmitted by secure cable. Numerous calls were placed by Project Headquarters [] to ascertain

25X1

information that either, (a) would be transmitted in message form by immediate precedence as soon as available or, (b) should have been a requirement in [] dictated by the Operations Order. Examples were takeoff and landing times, etc for the scheduled in-country training sorties.

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Since the primary purpose of this type deployment is to exercise deployment capability and all factors relating to it; and since all interested parties do wish to be kept fully informed of activities, recommend all appropriate [] traffic be a requirement of the Operations Order; i.e.,

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[] for training type sorties while at deployment site. Further, recommend all interested parties allow a "reasonable" amount of time to elapse subsequent to the event (T/O or landing) for the information to be obtained and transmitted prior to calling by insecure telephone. One other item of operational interest lies in the fact that all requirements of the Operations Order were not entirely complied with; i.e., AGE, etc to be on hand at the deployment site. It has been disclosed that the "advon" or survey team consisted

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of only one individual and that in fact he did not survey the deployment site. Total coordination was consummated []

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[] The overall operation was not affected by this procedure, most probably because Scope Saint had been to []

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[] in prior years. Specific problems related to this deficiency will be discussed in the Materiel Summary. From the Operations viewpoint, one individual from each primary directorate should be a member of the Survey Team. At least one individual from the deploying unit should be on this team, and most certainly the team should survey the actual deployment site.

The second in-country training sortie went without a hitch. Redeployment also went smoothly except for some minor commo difficulties. The article apparently tuned up one KC off desired frequency during a frequency change. []

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[] The redeployment support aircraft was a matter of concern due to its anticipated arrival time. A C-130 standby aircraft was eventually available if needed. Some change in the redeployment timing of detachment personnel occurred due to maintenance problems on the support C-141. Another aircraft was subsequently diverted [] and the group started home.

PROBLEMS/RECOMMENDATIONS

The overall deployment exercise went well operationally. The following problem areas were observed.

PROBLEM: No cross-wind runway available []

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RECOMMENDATION: For future Scope Saint deployments, the use of [] with an existing cross-wind runway is recommended.

PROBLEM: Excessive telephonic communications.

RECOMMENDATION: Restrict telephone calls to deployment site to initial line check if necessary and emergency type info.

PROBLEM: Deployment site not properly informed of detachment requirements.

RECOMMENDATION: Survey team visit deployment site prior to deployment to insure what facilities etc are to be available.

PROBLEM: Redeployment support aircraft arrival time was such that it was not effective for serving as a recovery vehicle in the event of article diversion and also delayed redeployment.

RECOMMENDATION: Schedule support aircraft to arrive approximately two hours prior to scheduled article launch with departure at the discretion of the DTFC. (The early arrival permits determination of aircraft status, refueling, partial loading and, if required, procuring alternate aircraft).

DTFC departure time to be based upon transfer of command and control plus improbability of article returning to deployment site.

MATERIEL SUMMARY

1. The proposed cargo was assembled and organized in load form on 14 Oct 71. During this preload exercise it was determined that several pieces of equipment would have to be eliminated from the manifest, limiting factor being overall cube. The final loading was 29,736 pounds and 2161 cube.
2. The support aircraft arrived at 1100L 18 Oct 71, and the aircraft commander authorized simultaneous loading and refueling. The loading was completed at 1330L with departure at 1400L. With the cooperation of the support aircraft crew the established time schedule was met, however, three hours ground time is not considered sufficient for the amount of work to be accomplished and should not become the standard. 25X1
3. The article was scheduled for deployment at [] 19 Oct 71. The launch, made in darkness, was on time and without a problem. The article was positioned at the launch pad on the end of runway 06 at [] and fueled to 2915 gallons. Due to the distance from Hangar 1, back-up AGE was provided but not used. The launch was normal in all respects. 25X1
4. No problems were encountered enroute by the support aircraft. On arrival [] one ten ton truck and a forklift were available for offloading. Due to the lack of transport, approximately 50% of the cargo was manhandled to the hangar some 1/2 mile away. The pre-arrival preparation of the hangar and ground support equipment was extremely limited. Only one hangar door could be opened; the hangar was being used to store ice and snow removal equipment; no ground equipment was on hand; the filters 25X1

had not been replaced in the refueler and the unit had only been purged with F34 fuel. The hosts were immediately informed of our requirements and actions were begun. No refueler filters were available on station so they were requested and arrived the following day. Some operating preparations such as shop power were still not complete at time of article arrival due to lack of equipment. Final base preparations were completed at [] 25X1 20 Oct 71.

5. The first shipment of JPTS, 2200 gallons, was received On 19 Oct 71 immediately after our arrival. This was followed by 2200 gallons on 22 Oct. Only 1100 gallons were requested for 25 October in order to insure a full load available and still minimize waste. There were 4660 gallons issued on site.

6. The article arrived at [] 20 October and debriefing 25X1 indicated no maintenance discrepancies. At a point during the ferry flight there was a loss of HF communications. This loss was believed to be due to propagation, however, the HF set was changed as a precautionary measure. The preflight for the first training flight was uneventful and again the article flew without a maintenance discrepancy. During the postflight some hydraulic seepage was noted at a horizontal stabilizer trim line and the line was replaced. [] 25X1

25X1 []

25X1 [] On downloading the T-35 tracker cycle count was only half of that scheduled. The unit was ground tested and operated

normally. The spare T-35 tracker was to be used on the second training mission but during preload testing it failed to function properly when material was loaded. Since moisture was the suspected cause, the tracker heater was operated after loading and prior to launch of the second training sortie. The unit functioned properly throughout the second flight.

7. The second training sortie was launched and recovered without difficulty and one discrepancy was reported - the doppler was inaccurate in latitude. This discrepancy was cleared by replacing the navigation computer control panel.

8. The configuration was downloaded after each sortie and stored in the special equipment tent. Following the second training sortie the exposed material was re-wound on 2000 foot spools and immediately shipped for processing.

9. The day following the second training sortie was spent preparing for the return ferry and packaging equipment which was no longer needed. The ferry mission preparation and launch were uneventful and final cargo preparation was completed 1+30 hours after launch except for selected communications equipment. All communications equipment was available for load by 1630L.

10. The first C-141 arrived [redacted] on 27 Oct.

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He advised that he lost a primary hydraulic system just prior to landing and suspected system contamination. After several hours of trouble shooting and telephone calls to [redacted]

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[redacted] it was decided to divert an aircraft [redacted] for our use. The second C-141 arrived [redacted] 28 Oct 71.

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With the aircraft commander electing to accept F34 fuel and

simultaneous loading, departure was such that we could reach

25X1 [] prior to expiration of the crew duty day.

11. The article recovered at Edwards [] 27 Oct 71. 25X1

Landing was made on the lakebed due to wind condition at that time. The article was O.R. at landing with no pilot discrepancies.

The support aircraft arrived at Edwards [] 28 Oct 71, 25X1

was offloaded and departed at 1645L. It should be noted that the weight and cube carried on this deployment exceeded that required for a Phase I or modified Phase I deployment as previously accomplished. This was due primarily to the addition of an extra config, material, and support personnel and equipment, all of which went unused. In the case at hand the loading was completed only because the loadmaster was willing to accept an extremely liberal interpretation of very specific directives pertaining to cargo tiedown.

PROBLEMS/RECOMMENDATIONS

1. PROBLEM: The cargo, duty personnel, and observers required to perform a modified Phase I deployment plus equipment and people required for additional contingency operations exceeds the carrying capability of a single C-141 support aircraft.

RECOMMENDATION: That we revert to the concept that the mission being performed is the deployment and that contingencies be supported on an "as required" basis.

2. PROBLEM: The host base was not adequately informed of our requirements, hence, they were not prepared for our arrival and operation.

RECOMMENDATION: The advanced party should include technically

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knowledgeable personnel from [] and they must travel to
and survey the actual deployment site.

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3. PROBLEM: The return support aircraft was rescheduled with-
out [] being informed.

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RECOMMENDATION: The deployment site be kept advised of all
actions which have any bearing on the operation.

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5. PROBLEM: A full service of JPTS was not available until
the third day after article arrival.

RECOMMENDATION: The first JPTS shipment should contain at
least 3000 gallons.

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LIFE SUPPORT SUMMARY

1. Between 18 and 28 October 1971 the unit deployed [REDACTED] in support of one U-2. Life Support was represented by [REDACTED] was also at [REDACTED] for four days.

2. Life support was allocated one large room which proved more than adequate for our Personal Equipment and Medical purposes. One major virtue of the room was that it contained a large number of lockers which were of great use for storing the pressure suits. One J2 vehicle was allocated for Life Support use and was a satisfactory PE van.

3. One ferry flight was recovered and one launched and in the interim two high flights were also fully supported. No problems were encountered and from the Life Support point of view the operation was highly successful.

4. Liason with the Station Medical Center was established and we were given ambulance cover for every launch and recovery. Apart from this we required no other support from the Station Medical Center.

5. Health of personnel was excellent apart from four minor injuries and a few head colds.

PROBLEMS/RECOMMENDATIONS

None

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